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northern and southern glacial periods), our author thinks that it "would be well for us to consider the propriety of erecting some durable monument in the United States to bear witness of us then."

Most of these opinions would concern the readers of this JOURNAL comparatively little were it not that our author includes them in a discussion which is intended to cast an especially strong light on the history and nature of religion,—a discussion, moreover, from which he draws several important morals as to the significance of human progress. On the whole, then, it is enough to say that the book is full of pretty confident assertions concerning some of the very darkest regions of the history of man's evolution. One questions whether such assertions will bring much light to anybody. One is quite sure that, in the present state of science, the author can prove very few of them, except the less important ones.

5. The "Directory of the Charitable and Beneficent Organizations of Boston" appears in a revised edition "after nearly six years' interval." The book is intended "especially to help those actively engaged in charitable work," and "it contains, therefore, many things beside descriptions of charitable societies." Among these "many things" one may note the "Legal Suggestions," which fill pages 287-316, and which are intended to "offer some general information" as to questions concerning the duties and rights of those with whom the visitors of the "Associated Charities" are likely to come in contact. This is one example only of the compact wealth of this authoritative little volume, which must interest those who are students of practical philanthropy, whether in Boston or elsewhere. To actual workers in benevolent enterprises in any American city the book must be indispensable.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

We have also received the following:

A PEDAGOGICAL LIBRARY. By Will S. Monroe, Superintendent of Schools, Pasadena, Cal. (Reprinted from the *Pacific Educational Journal*.) Oakland, 1892. Pp. 12. A brief bibliography for the use of teachers and of students of educational theory.

THE FOURTH INTERNATIONAL PRISON CONGRESS AT ST. PETERSBURG. Published by the U. S. Government Bureau of Education, 1891. Pp. 253.

THE THEORY OF DYNAMIC ECONOMICS. By Prof. Simon N. Patten. Philadelphia, 1892. Pp. viii., 153. Vol. III., No. 2, of the Publications of the University of Pennsylvania.

Of the "Series of Modern Philosophers," edited by Dr. Sneath, of Yale University, and published by Henry Holt & Co., of New York, we have received the new volumes:

SPINOZA. By Prof. Fullerton.

REID. By Dr. Sneath.

J. R.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIALISM. By John Rae, M.A. Second Edition. Revised and enlarged: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

In a second and improved edition of an already good book, Mr. Rae brings copious and ready knowledge, vigor of style, economic grasp, and some asperity of tone to an expository statement and hostile criticism of contemporary

socialism. By its title the work suggests comparison with M. Laveleye's similarly-named volume on the same subject. It will not suffer thereby. Mr. Rae's facts are more illustrative, his logical grip firmer, and his conclusions more definite. Put in brief, the drift of the book is that all that is good in socialism, popularly so called, can be justified; and justified, he would add, on the principles of "orthodox" political economy; and that whatsoever is more than this (by which we are to understand socialism strictly so called) cometh of evil in the shape of bad economic analysis; and goeth to evil in the shape of impaired industrial and commercial efficiency, and of projects unjust in their claims and visionary in most of their ends. This is the burden of a long new chapter on "State Socialism," the length of which (and it could be condensed) is justified by the author, not without reason, on the ground that it is into this "domesticated" form, this "shifty State Socialism" that "Socialism proper,"—*i.e.*, Revolutionary Social Democracy—is everywhere settling down. Gratitude is due to Mr. Rae, at the outset, for thus defining the thing he attacks. Cairnes (as Mr. Rae reminds us) had done the same long ago in his "Principles." But Cairnes, though one of the best, was not one of the most popular of economists; and, especially in a day when too many are in haste to call themselves, and too many to call their neighbors, "socialists," in both cases without reason, the need remains for making clear to the world what a socialist is, if only to prevent him from being compared with an average charitable gentleman on the one hand, and with a communist on the other. This need Mr. Rae supplies. It is, perhaps, a pity that on an early page (p. 6) he should have dropped a phrase which suggests that the socialist hope implies a swallowing up of private *property*, especially as no one knows better than he, or, indeed, makes it plainer, that socialism would be well content to leave us our private goods and chattels if it could but get rid of private *capital*. This, however, is but a slip which does not really interfere with the clearness of Mr. Rae's definition of socialism, which, as it exists at present, includes, on his diagnosis, three main features. First, the aspiration and effort after equality, material as well as moral and political; second, the insistence on this upon the ground (not of utility but) of right or "ransom;" third, the utilization of the State as the one adequate instrument for realizing the end desired. With the first of these Mr. Rae, like Cairnes, and, indeed, many a social reformer, is in fullest sympathy. Though not admitting things to be so bad, especially in tendency, as socialists make them, he does not defend the *status quo*. So far from defending it, he insists that a less unequal distribution of wealth is desirable, urgent, and, by the advent of democratic power, inevitable. "A penniless omnipotence is an insupportable presence." Nor is there wanting evidence enough in the pages of "Contemporary Socialism" that the most vehement opponent of socialism is not the conservative but the reformer.

Here, however, agreement ends. When we pass to the extent to which material equality is to run its course, the quarrel begins. And we cannot but think that on this issue Mr. Rae has taken judicious ground. There is a too easy Benthamite fashion of dealing with socialism,—to deny the existence of rights other than legal; and this done, to prove that as a socialistic pursuit of equality would menace security, it follows, in the name of utility, that security must carry the day. It is too simple. Men will continue, despite Bentham, to call what they

consider their just claims "rights," and if only they are prepared with proof they are surely entitled to do so. This is the line taken by Mr. Rae. He does not deny that men have rights (other than legal). On the contrary, no man could more positively insist that they have. "They (*i.e.*, men) have a right, to use Smith's phrase, to an undeformed and un mutilated humanity, to that original basis of human dignity which it is the business of organized society to defend for its weaker members against the assaults of fortune as well as the assaults of men." Nor is there anything made clearer in the whole book than that these "moral rights," as he calls them, demand for their realization an alteration of material conditions.

The fallacy of socialism, therefore, on Mr. Rae's view, is not that it takes its stand on rights, but that it takes its stand on rights which are extravagant and illusive. This, at least, is what he sets himself to prove. He caps the socialistic claim that the whole product of industry is the laborers' right by refuting (convincingly enough) the economic analysis on which, by Rodbertus, Marx, or Lassalle, it is based. And he equally rejects the "less definite," "not less unjustifiable," socialism of Wagner on the similar ground that it dogmatically assumes that inequalities of wealth are as such wrong, and to be got rid of. In short, while quick enough to recognize men's rights, and to include in these the just claims for a certain measure of material well-being, Mr. Rae, surely with reason, declines to admit rights that cannot be proved.

This attitude seems to us wise, in what it admits as well as in what it resists. Socialism has a much stronger case where there is no alternative plan forthcoming, except the merely political reform that would stop short at consciousness of rights civil and political. Nay, the possession of civil and political rights just because magnified as a boon by the merely political radical, is apt, at times, to seem a mockery in the eyes of men placed at such disadvantage in respect of ways and means that struggle for livelihood swamps all else. To remind men that they have civil rights or votes is not enough where there is an economic problem; and to deny that in a rich and civilized society like our own they have a just claim at any rate to that minimum of material well-being, without which their lives as men and citizens would be maimed and obstructed, this policy would only throw a dissatisfied people into the arms of socialism, which at any rate has the merit of recognizing that there *is* a social question. Mr. Rae adopts a policy at once wiser and juster in recognizing that citizens have not only "moral rights," but moral rights which have their expression and counterpart in material conditions. The first really involves the second. It can be nothing short of a contradiction to tell men that they have "a right to an undeformed and un mutilated humanity," and then to deny that, in a society so materially productive as ours, they have a right to that modest minimum of livelihood without which these "moral rights," or even political rights, will be no better than an unusable gift or a decoration without a coat to put it on.

There is nothing socialistic in this; and, indeed, Mr. Rae's book is well fitted to show that a man can thus frankly recognize these material rights, and yet find weighty reasons against embracing a remedy so extreme and experimental as socialism. One is the inefficiency which dogs state management in all but a limited class of undertakings,—an inefficiency which would be at its maximum

where—as necessarily under socialism—state management would be universal. Another is the power for good that lies in agencies (co-operation, trades-unionism, and so on) involving no revolutionary overturn of the existing system, not forgetting a reasonable use of state management to relieve distress, to provide wholesome conditions of life, such as parks and museums and libraries, and even to undertake management of business where it can be clearly shown that public authority has advantages over private enterprise. Still another is the consideration that to secure the modest minimum of material well-being demanded by “moral rights,” it is not necessary to have recourse to so tremendous a remedy as socialism. This last reminder is as just as it is needful. Few, even among the thoughtful adherents of socialism, have realized the magnitude of the revolution it would involve (as explained, *e. g.*, in Schäffle’s “Quintessence of Socialism”). Nor do they do anything like justice to the spirit of personal independence, which, it is to be hoped, will long continue to prompt the average workingman to rest content with an ideal that stops far short of equality of fortunes. The honest livelihood that will suffice for a reasonable enjoyment of home-life, for a real participation in the politics of his time, for some leisure (if there be inclination that way), for the things of the mind and spirit, for a sober prospect of provision against sickness and old age,—for these men may well struggle, by the way of socialism if they can find no other way. But as to what goes beyond these—material abundance in all its modes and forms (though no one who is not an ascetic need affect to despise it), “the man of independent mind,” as Burns puts it, “He looks and laughs at a’ that.”

So far, indeed, is anything like a levelling equality of conditions from being an essential part of a democratic programme, that a point is comparatively soon reached at which the question of ways and means, imperious up to a certain limit, begins rapidly to dwindle in importance when set in comparison with healthy houses, decent home-life, cheap and good education, active citizenship, access to the things of the mind, and many other of the conditions of a good life of which reformers need not despair, though they stop short of socialism. And it is because it tends so unmistakably to this view that Mr. Rae’s teaching seems wholesome as well as capable.

Not that we can follow him everywhere. He only weakens his case (for which he has plenty to say) when on an early page he drops the conjecture that we may find an escape from some of the evils of our present factory system in “electricity.” It may be so, of course; and the suggestion is according to the fashion of our day; but it strikes me as too hypothetical to be in harmony with the usual solidity of Mr. Rae’s argument. Nor can we quite accept his somewhat labored plea, even when buttressed by quotations from McCulloch, something of which might well have been spared, that “orthodox” English Political Economy can naturally find room for his own excellent doctrine as to what the state may do to enable men “to live the true life of a man and fulfil the proper ends of rational being.” Passages may doubtless be cited to that effect, even from the orthodox of the orthodox; and it would be rash to say that the early economists did not recognize that the state had a function. The misfortune was that they did not always, if ever, furnish their readers with a principle to reconcile the true order of their teaching; thereby leading them to adopt *laissez-faire*

and forget the other side. If this is not what actually happened it is hard to understand why Carlyle clamors so loudly for "new definitions of liberty;" why the friends of Factory Legislation so often held the economists as enemies; why J. S. Mill was looked askance upon (by Grote and others) as little better than a dangerous heretic because to their doctrine that society forbade much it ought not to forbid, he was bold enough to add that there were things it left alone which it ought to control. In any case the apology for McCulloch (even taking him as a type) seems, in the length of its quotations, out of proportion to the subject of the book.

Here and there, too, exception may be taken to isolated expressions: "Teeth set on edge against one are easily brought to gnash at all" is surely not a happy metaphor; "quips and arrows of fortune" does not sound right; nor can we accept the sweeping dictum (p. 419), "impracticable legislation is always unjust legislation, and unjust legislation for behoof of the laboring class is essentially socialistic."

These, however, are rare blemishes. Not only is there much in the book good, both in matter and in style, to which it has been impossible in these limits even to allude; instance the new chapters on "Nihilism" and "The Progress and Present Position of Socialism." It is from first to last the work of a mind vigorous, well-informed, evenly-balanced, and, if hostile to socialism even to bitterness, emphatically not hostile to the cause of social reform.

JOHN MACCUNN.

THE CONDITION OF LABOR: AN OPEN LETTER TO POPE LEO XIII. By Henry George, author of "Progress and Poverty," etc., with an Appendix containing the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII. on the Condition of Labor. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891. [Social Science Series.]

This earnest and eloquent Letter to the Pope is by far the most remarkable utterance which the Encyclical of last summer has evoked. The Pope could not have found a fitter controversialist to oppose him, for Mr. George meets him on the same basis of metaphysical theology, and appeals to the same authority of Scripture and St. Thomas of Aquino. And the whole letter seems, in its manner, curiously to echo the Pope's own dignified ecclesiastical-Latin style. Mr. George feels that the Encyclical is directed more strongly against his own "single tax" panacea than against what is vaguely called Socialism, which in a moderate form it favors. The Pope expressly puts property in land on the same level with property of any other kind, and expressly maintains that private property in this wide sense is a "natural right" of man, prior to the formation of any State. Mr. George, like the Pope, believes in "natural rights;" but he works out this vague and treacherous conception in his own way. "The right of property," he says, "attaches to things produced by labor, but cannot attach to things created by God. Thus, if a man take a fish from the ocean he acquires a right of property in that fish, which exclusive right he may transfer by sale or gift. But he cannot obtain a similar right of property in the ocean, so that he may sell *it*, or give *it*, or forbid others to use *it*" (p. 4). Does Mr. George mean that the fish was not created by God? He can hardly expect his Holiness to believe that; nor are any of us likely to believe that it was "produced" by the fisherman